

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-05-2004		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Contractors on the Battlefield: Flexible Tool for the Operational Commander or Unacceptable Sustainment Complication				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Richard B. Pennycuick Paper Advisor (if Any): Paul St. Laurent				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT Civilians accompanying and supporting military forces is a time honored tradition the world over. Under the recent label of Contractors on the Battlefield (CoB), American military doctrine has blossomed over the previous decade to include joint and service level doctrine, policy and procedures for the effective employment of CoB. Unless contractor support is considered and built into the logistic support plan from the beginning of planning, the operational commander may not gain the maximum advantage available from all his resources. Reality dictates full integration of the CoB tool to give maximum flexibility to the operational commander's plans and operations. This paper examines many aspects of CoB relevant to the operational commander including its: historical perspective; need; doctrine; and effects on the operational commander. This paper will also list specific recommendations relating to CoB for the operational commander's consideration based on research findings and government agency reports.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Contractors, Battlefield, Doctrine, Operational Level of Command					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**Contractors on the Battlefield: Flexible Tool for the Operational Commander or
Unacceptable Sustainment Complication?**

by

Richard B. Pennycuick

LTC, US Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature _____

18 May 2004

Professor Paul St. Laurent, College of Distance Education

Abstract

Contractors on the Battlefield:

Flexible Tool for the Operational Commander or Unacceptable Sustainment Complication?

Civilians accompanying and supporting military forces is a time honored tradition the world over. Under the recent label of Contractors on the Battlefield (CoB), American military doctrine has blossomed over the previous decade to include joint and service level doctrine, policy, and procedures for the effective employment of CoB. Unless contractor support is considered and built into the logistic support plan from the beginning of planning, the operational commander may not gain the maximum advantage available from all his resources. Reality dictates full integration of the CoB tool to give maximum flexibility to the Operational commander's plans and operations. This paper examines many aspects of CoB relevant to the operational level commander including its: historical perspective; need; doctrine; and effects on the operational commander. This paper will also list specific recommendations relating to CoB for the operational commander's consideration based on research findings and government agency reports.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Introduction	1
Historical Perspective.....	2
Why Contractors on the Battlefield?.....	4
What Does Doctrine Tell Us?.....	8
Effects on the Operational Commander.....	11
Recommendations.....	15
Conclusion.....	17
End Notes.....	18
Bibliography.....	20

Introduction

*“Change is inevitable in a progressive country.
Change is constant.”*

Benjamin Disraeliⁱ

Hiring civilians to support military operations is not a new concept. History details many successes in battle directly attributable to civilian participation in logistic efforts. Contractors on the Battlefield (CoB), referring to the contracted organization versus the individual contractor, is the latest moniker to identify and categorize the actions civilian support organizations provide to military forces. What is new is the degree to which the current expansion of CoB is spreading to the many elements of operational logistic functions. The level of change to traditional organic logistic structures and protocols over the last decade is unprecedented. “Previously, contractors were used primarily in a rear support area role.”ⁱⁱ Today our forces fighting the Global War on Terrorism face opponents that do not conveniently rely on conventional battlefield notions of time and space, thereby negating the concept of relatively secure rear areas as safe havens for logistic operations.

In planning to win on the modern battlefield across the spectrum of conflict, the operational commander must recognize the inherent risks and rewards of utilizing contractor support and incorporate this logistic option into every stage of planning. Joint force logistic planners have a multitude of planning considerations and options available when crafting operational level logistics in support of the overall mission. Reality dictates full integration of the CoB tool to give maximum flexibility to the operational commander’s plans and operations. Unless contractor support is considered and built into the logistic support plan from the beginning of planning, the operational commander may not gain the maximum

advantage available from all his resources. This paper examines many aspects of CoB relevant to the operational commander including its: historical perspective; need; doctrine; types; and effects on the operational commander. This paper will also list specific recommendations relating to CoB for the operational commander's consideration based on research findings and government agency reports.

Historical Perspective

The history of mankind parallels the history of armed conflict. While the exact beginning of war is lost to prerecorded history, there are myriad examples of logistic evolution that portend the advent of civilian support to warfare. Our own unique military logistic history evolved directly from the 18th century European model, specifically akin to the British military. "Even before the establishment of the United States Army in 1775, American military leaders were accustomed to relying on civilian contractors to fulfill the needs of their troops on campaign. Since 1775, American armies have always been accompanied on the battlefield, both at home and abroad, by civilian contractors."ⁱⁱⁱ

The advent of the Industrial Revolution became the forcing function for major military reform beginning in the late 19th century. Such advances in technology as the machine gun, rifled artillery and communications advances all set the stage for larger world conflicts. New and improved roles for CoB also coincided with the advances in warfare:

"The use of contractors on the battlefield as we now understand the practice grew during World War II...for the first time...the manufacturer's technical representative became a prominent feature in forward areas. The increased complexity of military aircraft, signal equipment, vehicles and other war materiel produced by American factories, the rapid introduction of new and improved models, and frequent changes in operating and maintenance requirements made the "tech rep" a welcome addition at forward airfields, depots and repair facilities. In some cases,

tech reps were even to be found in the front lines seeking solutions to technical and operational problems regarding equipment supplied by their firms.”^{iv}

During the Vietnam War the military continued the trend of using technically oriented CoB due to a new generation of technologically advanced systems. It also saw the large scale introduction of base support operations over the duration of the war. “A good deal of the necessary construction work was performed by engineer units of the various services, but a number of private contractors also participated...the firm of Richardson-Morrison-Knudsen-Brown-Root-Jacobsen (RMK-BRJ), a lineal descendent of which, Brown & Root Services...is the principal U.S. Army battlefield contractor today, nearly forty years later.”^v

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODSS) required a logistic effort in time and resources not previously attempted by the American military to ensure operational reach on a vast scale. As with previous conflicts, CoB were present and provided the logistic support and expertise required. “Contractors performed an essential and vital role in the theater. Given the downsizing of the military services, the fact that a number of systems were fully contractor supported...[and] the nonavailability of trained military technicians...there was no viable option other than to use contractors to supplement the “green-suit” maintenance.”^{vi}

The trends of contractor support of military operations continued during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) actions conducted in the 1990’s. Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard in the Balkans furthered the growing trend of ever increasing CoB support of deployed forces. “Some 5,200 contractor employees accompanied the 541,000 troops who fought in the Persian Gulf War. That’s one contractor for every 100 or so military service members. In the Balkans, the ratio has risen to almost one and one-half contractors for every soldier with more than 12,000 contractors supporting slightly more than 9,000

soldiers.”^{vii} Arguably the mission sets were different between these conflicts, but the trend towards continued and even increased use of CoB is unavoidable. In the Balkans experience where regular troop rotation is the norm, contractors “offer stability and experience that soldiers cannot gain during their half-year tours.”^{viii} History proves that CoB is not a new or radical undertaking for the American military, yet critics continue to voice opposition based on fear of the unknown and failure to grasp its benefits. The next chapter in the history of CoB is being written today in Iraq in concert with overarching operational lessons learned as Operation Iraqi Freedom continues to evolve.

Why Contractors on the Battlefield?

Mission Accomplishment

Successful mission accomplishment underpins all aspects of military service ethos. The operational level of war, typically concerned with a theater of operations, is focused “on the employment of military forces to achieve theater-strategic objectives through the planning, preparation and execution of a single campaign...[or] by conducting a major joint operation.”^{ix} Coherently linking the strategic and tactical levels of war together is the essence of operational art. “Operational art today can be defined as a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given theater.”^x One major component of applying operational art is the accomplishment of operational logistics. Linking the strategic to tactical levels of sustainment is the nexus of operational logistics. This is accomplished by linking the American defense industry, our home base of support, to the tactical unit level of logistics in support of military forces

deployed throughout the world. “This responsibility includes the identification of logistic requirements and establishment of priorities, and ensuring that the operations are sustained resulting in the desired operational tempo. This level of command is responsible for the theater sustainment base.”^{xi} CoB is one of the many tools that logistic planners use to create optimized plans in support of mission accomplishment.

Insufficient Military Capability and Restrictive Policies

Downsizing, outsourcing, and privatizing all encapsulate the concept of shifting an organization’s focus to core competencies while shedding the excess human capital not directly attributable to mission success. At the national strategic level the Department of Defense (DOD) underwent a major downsizing program starting just prior to Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODSS). During ODSS, full scale downsizing was temporarily suspended only to begin again with renewed vitality immediately after ODSS major combat actions ceased. American military budgets declined in anticipation of garnering a national level “Peace Dividend” that simply did not materialize. “Increased use of civilian contractors should not be surprising. Today, U.S. Forces and budgets are down 40% relative to where they were in 1989. For the Army, that’s 111 combat brigades reduced to 63. Yet, since that time, the U.S. Army has deployed troops on 36 occasions compared to 10 deployments during the 40 year Cold War.”^{xii} Reducing the overall manpower pool to pull from limits any organization’s baseline effectiveness. In the case of the Army, the pool was reduced while deployments increased creating the perfect opportunity for business entities to once again prove their utility by providing CoB support to the increasing workload. “One way to fill the void left by downsizing of our logistics forces is to use contractors on the battlefield.

Contractors will not replace our force structure, but they will augment the Army’s capabilities and provide an additional option for meeting support requirements.”^{xiii} In the instance of understanding the level of recent growth in CoB, there are reasons that transcend purely budget driven analysis that are more akin to politically restrictive policies.

“The military uses contractors to support deployed forces for several reasons. One reason is that in some deployed areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the Executive Branch has limited the number of U.S. military personnel who can be deployed in those countries at any one time. When these limits, known as force caps, are in place, contractors replace soldiers so that the soldiers will be available to undertake activities with the potential for combat. A second reason that DOD uses contractors is because either the required skills are not available in the military or are only available in limited numbers and need to be available to deploy for other contingencies.”^{xiv}

Services Provided

The services that CoB offers to the military are as varied as those provided by organic logistic support organizations and are arranged depending on specific mission requirements.

“Table 1: Selected Services Provided by Contractors in Deployed Locations, from a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) illustrates locations and types of contractor support.”^{xv}

Service	Balkans	Southwest Asia	Central Asia
Weapons systems support	X	X	X
Intelligence analysis	X	X	X
Linguists	X	X	X
Base operations support	X	X	X
Logistics support	X	X	
Prepositioned equipment maintenance		X	
Non-tactical communications	X	X	
Generator maintenance	X	X	X
Biological/chemical detection systems		X	X
Management and control of government property	X	X	X
Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence	X	X	X
Continuing education	X		
Fuel and material transport	X	X	X
Security guards	X	X	
Tactical and non-tactical vehicle maintenance	X	X	
Medical service		X	
Mail service	X		

Source: GAO.

High-tech weapon systems are not the only items contractors assist the military with. “For example, in a relatively stable environment such as the Balkans, contractors provide...food, laundry, recreational, construction and maintenance, road maintenance, waste management, fire-fighting, power generation, and water production and distribution services....parts and equipment distribution, ammunition accountability and control,...as well as support to weapon systems and tactical vehicles.”^{xvi} The most recent and highly publicized area of contractor involvement is in the security arena. Providing private security forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is a burgeoning business due to the volatile security situation and the desire to free up soldiers for other missions. Ever since four contractors were killed and their bodies displayed on a bridge near Fallujah, an increased amount of attention has been levied at all CoB operating in Iraq. Security contractors provide a service: “what we do is fill the gaps that the military or police departments don’t have the resources to fill.”^{xvii} Cost effectiveness is also part of the equation when deciding to fill military support roles with civilians. It is generally “more cost effective to hire support staff – cooks and truck drivers, for example – than to have trained soldiers fill those roles.”^{xviii} With the increase in large numbers of private security working in Iraq comes questioning and oversight from Congress. “The armed security personnel ‘provide only defensive services,’ and have been operating for more than a year without clear regulatory guidance, according to a ‘discussion paper’ that [Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld sent to Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri.”^{xix}

What Does Doctrine Tell Us?

“In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.”

Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781^{xx}

Doctrine Evolution

Over the last decade as the military has steadily increased the usage of CoB, both service level and joint doctrine has evolved to fill the policy void. The Army developed and implemented one of the first comprehensive doctrinal publications on March 26, 2000, with Field Manual (FM) 100-21, *Contractors on the Battlefield*. This was the product of cross functional elements inside the Army coming together to produce a single guide for commanders and staff officers at all echelons to utilize in planning and operations. It is also used by program managers and other stakeholders involved in planning for the use of contractors in a theater of operations.

The Army is the recognized leader in the development of CoB doctrine for one simple reason – opportunity. The Army became a consistently deploying entity when historic decreases in “tail-to-tooth” ratios were underway. Simply put, the Army had no choice but to support operational and tactical missions by procuring additional logistic expertise. This spark of events during the previous decade acted as a forcing function for doctrine developers, logistic institutions, program managers and headquarters policy makers to coalesce, produce workable policy and disseminate it throughout the Army. In his article, “Institutionalizing Contractor Support on the Battlefield,” Joe Fortner details the basic tenets and principles underpinning the evolving doctrine:

“Using contractors to provide support and services to military operations is not without risks or costs. Institutionalizing their use in doctrine therefore must be based on certain governing principles. These principles are not absolutes; some of them, in fact, may be mutually exclusive at certain levels of detail...Contractors do not replace force structure. They augment Army capabilities and provide additional options for meeting support requirements. Depending on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC), contractors may deploy throughout an area of operations and in virtually all conditions. Commanders are legally responsible for protecting contractors in their area of operations. Contractors must have enough employees with appropriate skills to meet potential requirements. Contracted support must be integrated into the overall support plan.”^{xxi}

These statements highlight the level of deliberate intellectual activity expended in the pursuit of actionable policy. This logic sets the stage for the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that operational logisticians should leverage to glean the absolute maximum advantage from CoB. Finally, it serves to establish a common baseline that commanders and staff officers should use as a departure point for undertaking either deliberate or crisis action planning.

Types of Contractors

There are three main types of contractor support delineated in joint and service doctrine: systems support contractors; theater support contractors; and external theater support contractors. Systems support contractors are most often associated with a specific new weapon system. These contractors may support a system over its entire life-cycle under long term contractor logistic support (CLS) contracts or only during initial fielding activities under an interim contractor support (ICS) arrangement. The primary advantages gained under a system support contractor support arrangement are in-depth understanding of the product line and consistent levels of support. “Systems contractors, made up mostly of US citizens,

provide support in garrison and may deploy with the force to both training and real-world operations.”^{xxii}

Theater Support Contractors “support deployed operational forces pursuant to contracts arranged within the mission area, or prearranged contracts through HN [host nation] and/or regional businesses and vendors.”^{xxiii} This is the contracting that is provided by experts in a specific region. Simply put these CoB are generally more familiar with the operational commander’s logistic support team; in military parlance they may have the benefit of a habitual relationship. “Theater-support contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction, usually from the local commercial sources, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Theater support contracts are the type of contract typically associated with contingency contracting.”^{xxiv}

External Support Contractors, also known as External Theater Support Contractors, support operations in a given theater under the authority of a headquarters outside of the immediate area of operations, operating in a classic supporting role for the operational commander. “They may operate under pre-arranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission. Contracting officers who award and administer external support contracts retain unique contracting authority derived from organizations other than the theater PARC [Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting].”^{xxv}

“Examples include the Army’s LOGCAP [Logistic Civil Augmentation Program], the Air Force’s AFCAP [Air Force Contract Augmentation Program], the Navy’s CONCAP [Construction Capabilities Program], CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] contracts, and war reserve materiel (WRM) contracts.”^{xxvi} The differing relationships each of these types of

contractors has with the operational command and the unique functions performed by each act on the operational logistic planning process in subtle yet significant ways.

Joint level capstone doctrine contained in Joint Publication 4-0, Chapter V, regarding CoB expands on defining types and functions of CoB. It delineates information appropriate for the operational commander's consideration regarding: integrated planning; overall contractor visibility; time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) force flow; arrival action in theater; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI); applicable laws; and a CINCs [Combatant Commander's] responsibilities.^{xxvii}

Effects on the Operational Commander

CoB generally require some level of support from the supported military organization. Every contract can contain specific clauses that delineate these items as government furnished equipment or property. The contractor proposes these items or the government can stipulate their usage, typically for cost control reasons or to eliminate excessive redundancy. Regardless of type of CoB under consideration - systems support, theater support or external theater support - the government in the person of the operational commander is bound to provide these certain support items to keep costs and services whole as planned in the instant contract. From a tactical vantage point this may be construed as overly restrictive and binding compared to organic military logistic units. Utilizing CoB forces logistic planners to consider the unique requirements of CoB similar to considerations given organic forces during the deliberate or crisis action planning process. They are another tool and planning is essential for their successful integration into the overall operational logistic plan.

Increased Force Protection Responsibility

The logistic benefit represented by CoB should be balanced against any additional force protection required based upon a METT-TC analysis. In a zero sum gain environment this is not the unforecast “bill” it may appear. Additional force protection is required at some level for all service support units, the difference being that military units have inherent self protection capabilities. One lesson learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), specifically the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company and the subsequent capture of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, is that on a non-linear battlefield all logistics units require some degree of additional force protection.

Critics have long questioned the staying power of CoB in dangerous environments. In his article “Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Road Ahead,” Eric Orsini and Gary Bublitz ask a pointed question that numerous serious studies have raised in various forms, “Will contractor support be there when needed? Anytime a discussion of contractors on the battlefield comes up, so does the question of whether or not contractors will be there when needed....The issue facing us is not whether large defense contractors will continue to service the contract, but whether or not they will be able to keep their employees on the battlefield when and where needed.”^{xxviii} Nowhere is this question better answered than in OIF today during the post-major-combat-action phase of operations. CoB operating in dangerous environments continue to provide a full range of logistic support to our military forces. They are getting the job done for our forces, but not without losses. “Many lives already have been lost: 35 employees and subcontractors of Halliburton Co. have been killed doing jobs under contracts that provide all kinds of services to the U.S. Army, including delivering mail and

supplies....A Halliburton spokeswoman...said the Houston company will continue to meet its contractual obligations. The company continues to hire several hundred people every week for deployment to the Middle East.”^{xxix} The measure of resolve of the individuals, as well as the CoB organizations, has been tested – they are withstanding the physical pressure and debunking conventional wisdom that CoB lacked staying power. This is in no small way attributable to the level of coordination and integration of force protection activities in theater.

Flexibility

Operational flexibility is the “ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and the concept of the operations.”^{xxx} CoB fulfills this concept by giving military logisticians the ability to quickly change focus, shift forces or begin new operations while maintaining proper service support in numerous areas. “A good example is LOGCAP support in Haiti where the plan for forced entry quickly changed...thousands of soldiers suddenly became peacekeepers...commanders immediately focused their attention on improving living conditions of their soldiers and expediting the return of combat service support units to the United States.”^{xxxi} Corporate leaders have long recognized the value of providing a flexible logistic support option to military forces. Profit motive is a powerful tool in garnering and maintaining a ready organization when the call comes for support. Concern still exists that CoB are overly restrictive to a commander’s planning of logistic operations. “The contract also can limit command and control flexibility if it becomes the controlling factor. Consequently, the contracting officer’s representative (COR) is assigned the task of working with field commanders and contractors to interpret, implement, and modify contracts as required by the mission. This process reduces flexibility and may jeopardize mission

execution.”^{xxxii} The operational versus tactical level of war is characterized by larger scale and generally longer timelines for action and reaction. Timing reality plus the fact that many lessons learned regarding contingency contracting and CoB have been driven into doctrine and policy over the last decade, all combine to drive combatant commander’s towards LOGCAP-type contracts primarily for the convenience and flexibility they offer-in essence they help buy back flexibility lost using more traditional contracting methods. These contracts are not inexpensive options for a long duration mission, as was demonstrated in Bosnia in 1996 and 1997 when the Joint Forces Headquarters learned a belated lesson about how quickly a budget can be drained by out of control requirements growth. Base camp requirements were not initially controlled, an oversight soon rectified by imposition of a standing Joint Acquisition Review Board to systematically review requirements (after many millions of dollars worth of lessons learned). The fact is that many contracts today offer tremendous advantages from an operational commanders’ vantage point of flexibility. East Timor offers another view of successful operational flexibility using COB. “In order to free units for other missions and reduce personnel and operating tempo, USPACOM began to explore alternative courses of action...it was decided to explore the possibility of contracting with commercial sources...USAPACOM settled on the Army Materiel Command’s LOGCAP as the best source of support for this mission.”^{xxxiii}

Command and Control (C2) – Managing versus Leading

Operational commanders apply the concept of unity of effort through cooperation versus unity of command when dealing with CoB. An operational commander directs CoB using different methods than those used with organic military logistic support units. Direct control

of individual contractors is the sole responsibility of the company they work for, not the military. Commanders therefore have an indirect, though effective, control mechanisms through the contracting officer for controlling CoB actions and emphasis. “Contractor personnel may have administrative privileges suspended for disciplinary infractions...The process for removal of contractor employees...is dependent upon the policies issued by the theater commander and the extent to which those policies are incorporated in the terms of the contract, and are executed through the contracting officer.”^{xxxiv} Individual contractor personnel are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) except in time of declared war. Interestingly enough for a large portion of CoB this relation to UCMJ “does not apply to retired members of the military who may be subjected to action under the UCMJ.”^{xxxv} Another aspect worthy of the operational commander’s interest is what the contractor’s standing is under any existing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). “The United States does not have a SOFA with every country....SOFAs vary just like contracts vary....Therefore a contractor employee’s status will depend upon the specific provisions of the SOFA.”^{xxxvi}

Recommendations

CoB is working successfully today in support of our military across the spectrum of conflict. There are however, opportunities for improvement. Operational commanders and logistic staff elements need greater visibility over the contractors in their respective areas of operation. This finding is documented in a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) Report (GAO-03-695) that says, “visibility of all contractor support at a specific location is practically nonexistent at the combatant commands, component commands, and deployed

locations we visited except in Bosnia, where a coordinated effort has been undertaken to identify all contractor support.”^{xxxvii} This lack of visibility coupled with the inherent indirect modicum of control can limit a commander’s ability to “resolve issues associated with contractor support such as force protection issues and provision of support to the contractor personnel.”^{xxxviii} Compounding this problem is the overall “inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing contractors and limited awareness by many field commanders of all the contractor activities taking place in their area of operations.”^{xxxix} Potential solutions to these difficulties exist, some that fall directly under the purview of the operational commander and some that require DOD and service level action. One recommendation is to inculcate training for logistic planners regarding basic through intermediary contracting. Contracting and systems acquisition courses are available online and in residence through the Defense Acquisition University. Attaining spaces for attendance is merely a matter of command influence. This basic level training provides planners with the required framework for learning the intricacies of CoB. Another recommendation is to simply use what exists, thereby leveraging existing proven control mechanisms: the Joint Acquisition Review Board to control requirements; the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), the contracting professional designated by the commander to represent him in contractual actions; Service or Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) lead Logistic Support Elements (LSE) to coordinate all the disparate parts of logistic support, including all CoB elements; and the Defense Contract Management Agency’s Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) Teams in theater specifically managing larger support type contracts like LOGCAP. Another area for improvement is in the development and implementation of common, standardized contractual clauses regarding deployment requirements. These could include

mechanisms requiring CoB to report to the lead operational logistic element in a given area of operations (AO). These clauses need not be expensive to originate, they merely sit idle until activated by a contracting officer. Finally, our doctrine must be firmly reinforced in practice - the need for joint logistic centers to become more responsible for pulling information as well as waiting for contractors to push the information to them is crucial. Inculcating the incorporation of CoB into logistics falls under the rubric of “Train as you fight, and fight as you train.”

Conclusion

“The question for Army Leaders is not whether to use civilian contractors on the battlefield but rather how to use them with maximum effectiveness and least cost.”

Dr. Charles R. Shrader^{xl}

We simply can not afford to maintain a full-time logistic structure large enough to meet any potential surge requirement anywhere in the world. Our budgets simply could not withstand the strain. This very basic fact absolutely necessitates continued critical analysis, sober thought and integration of the best parts of each military service’s logistic structures and programs to include CoB doctrines, policies, and TTPs. CoB is not just another bureaucratic tool invented to overwhelm the warfighter - it is a ready made logistical support concept that provides future operational commanders a much higher degree of flexibility and opportunity for success.

End Notes

ⁱThe Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, pg. BT-67

ⁱⁱCaptain Isolde K. Garcia-Perez, "Contractors on the Battlefield in the 21st Century," Army Logistician, 31 (Nov/Dec 1999): 40.

ⁱⁱⁱCharles R. Shrader, Contractors on the Battlefield, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Landpower Essay Series, no. 99-6 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the United States Army, 1999), 1-2.

^{iv}Ibid., 6.

^vIbid., 8.

^{vi}George B. Dibble, Charles L. Horne, III, and William E. Lindsay, Army Contractor and Civilian Maintenance, Supply, and Transportation Support During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1993), G-3.

^{vii}George Cahlink, "Army of Contractors," Government Executive, 34 (February 2002): 2.
<<http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb>> [10 May 2004].

^{viii}Ibid., 2.

^{ix}Dr. Milan Vego, Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: US Naval War College 2000), 21.

^xIbid., 2.

^{xi}Ibid., 22.

^{xii}Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend Upon Them (Springfield, VA: Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics 2000), 2. <<http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Campbell00.html>> [26 March 2004].

^{xiii}Garcia-Perez, 40.

^{xiv}General Accounting Office, Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans, Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: 2003), 2.

^{xv}Ibid., 7.

^{xvi}Ibid.

^{xvii}Clayton Collins, "War-Zone Security is a Job For...Private Contractors?" Christian Science Monitor, (3 May 2004): 1. <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040503281546.html>>

^{xviii}Ibid.

^{xix}Vince Crawley, "Small army of civilian workers has not clear guidance, Rumsfeld acknowledges," Navy Times, (5 May 2004): 1. <<http://www.navytimes.com/story.php?=-0-292925-2891415.php>>

^{xx}Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington DC: 6 April 2000), V-1.

^{xxi}Joe A Fortner, "Institutionalizing Contractor Support on the Battlefield," Army Logistician, 32 (Jul/Aug 2000): 2-3. <<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb>> [12 May 2004].

^{xxii}Headquarters Department of the Army, Contractors on the Battlefield, FM3-100.21 (100-21) (Washington, DC: 3 January 2003), 1-3.

^{xxiii}Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington DC: 6 April 2000), V-2.

^{xxiv}"Contractors on the Battlefield," 1-3.

^{xxv}Fortner, 3.

^{xxvi}Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington DC: 6 April 2000), V-2.

^{xxvii}Ibid., V-3-V-5.

^{xxviii}Eric A. Orsini and Gary T. Bublitz, "Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Road Ahead?" Army Logistician, 31 (Jan/Feb 1999): 2. <<http://www/almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb99/MS376.htm>>

^{xxix}Russell Gold, "Western Contractors Upgrade Their Security In Iraq," Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2004, p. 6. <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040512284733.html>>

^{xxx}Vego, 265.

^{xxxi}Marilyn Harris, LOGCAP: The Nation's Premier Contingency Contracting Program for Force XXI (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College 2000), 13.

^{xxxii}Orsini and Bublitz, 2.

^{xxxiii}Phillip M. Mattox and William A. Guinn, "Contingency Contracting in East Timor," Army Logistician, 32 (Jul/Aug 2000):3. <<http://proquest.umi.com>>

^{xxxiv}Headquarters Department of the Army, Contractors on the Battlefield, DA Pamphlet 715-16 (Washington, DC: 27 February 1998), 5.

^{xxxv}Ibid.

^{xxxvi}Ibid., 4.

^{xxxvii}General Accounting Office, Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans, Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: 2003), 3.

^{xxxviii}Ibid.

^{xxxix}Ibid., 2.

^{xl}Shrader, 13.

Bibliography

Books and Documents

Buhler, Carl A. When Contractors Deploy: A Guide for the Operational Commander. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000.

Campbell, Gordon L. Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them. Springfield, VA: Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, 2000.

Dibble, George B., Charles L. Horne, III, and William E. Lindsay, Army Contractor and Civilian Maintenance, Supply, and Transportation Support During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1993.

Foster, Susan C. Contractors on the Battlefield: Force Multipliers or Detractors? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998.

Harris, Marilyn. LOGCAP: The Nation's Premier Contingency Contracting Program for Force XXI. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000.

McCullough, James J. and Abram J. Pafford, Contractors on the Battlefield: Emerging Issues for Contractor Support in Combat & Contingency Operations. Briefing Papers, Second Series, June 2002.

McKenna, Dave. US Military Logistics Management, Privatization, and Contractors on the Battlefield: What Does This All Mean? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002.

Nelson, Kim M. Contractors on the Battlefield: Force Multipliers or Force Dividers? Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University. Air Command and Staff College, 2000.

Schrader, Charles R. Contractors on the Battlefield. Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 1999.

U.S. Department of the Army. Contracting Support on the Battlefield. Field Manual 100-10-2. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Headquarters, 4 August 1999.

_____. Contractors Accompanying the Force. Army Regulation 715-9. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Headquarters, 29 October 1999.

-
- _____. Contractors Deployment Guide. DA Pamphlet 715-16. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Headquarters, 27 February 1998.
- _____. Contractors on the Battlefield. Field Manual 3-1000.21DA Pamphlet 715-16. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Headquarters, 3 January 1003.
- _____. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Headquarters, 16 December 1985.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans. Washington, DC: GAO, June 2003.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. Joint Publication 4-0. Washington, DC: JCS, 6 April 2000.
- U.S. National Defense University. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000. Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1. Norfolk, VA: JFSC, 2000.
- Vego, Milan. Operational Warfare. Newport, RI: US Naval War College 2000.
- Young, David L. Operational Planning for Contractors on the Battlefield. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998.

Periodical Articles

- Althouse, James E. "Contractors on the Battlefield: What Doctrine Says and Doesn't Say." Army Logistician 30, no. 6 (November/December 1998): 14-17.
- Cahlink, George. "Army of Contractors." Government Executive, 34 (February 2002): 2.
- Carlson, Tucker. "Hired Guns." Esquire (March 2004): 130-136, 173-174.
- Collins, Clayton. "War-Zone Security is a Job For...Private Contractors?" Christian Science Monitor, (3 May 2004): 1.
- Edwards, Travis. "Contract Support for Operation Enduring Freedom." Army Logistician 35, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 22-24.
- Ferris, Stephen P. and David M. Keithly. "Outsourcing the Sinews of War: Contractor Logistics." Military Review 82, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 72-83.

Fortner, Joe A. "Institutionalizing Contractor Support on the Battlefield." Army Logistician 32, no. 4 (July/August 2000): 12-15.

_____. "Managing, Deploying, Sustaining, and Protecting Contractors on the Battlefield." Army Logistician 32, no.5 (September/October 2000): 3-7.

Garcia-Perez, Isolde. "Contractors on the Battlefield in the 21st Century." Army Logistician 31, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 40-43.

Gavora, William M. "Prime Vendor Support—The Wave of the Future." Army Logistician 31, no. 1 (November/December 1999): 40-43.

Mattox, Philip M. and William A. Guinn. "Contingency Contracting in East Timor." Army Logistician 32, no. 4 (July/August 2000): 30-34.

McPeak, Phillip M. and Sandra N. Ellis. "Managing Contractors in Joint Operations: Filling the Gaps in Doctrine." Army Logistician 36, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 6-9.

Orsini, Eric A. and Lieutenant Colonel Gary T. Bublitz. "Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Road Ahead?" Army Logistician 31, no.1 (January/February 1999): 2.

Tiron, Roxana. "Army Not Equipped to Manage Contractors on the Battlefield." National Defense 88, no. 598 (September 2003): 32-33.

Young, David L. "Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield." Army Logistician 31, no. 3 (May/June 1999): 10-13.